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Abstract
Aim This article aims at giving an overview of five ethical
problem areas relating to traffic safety, thereby providing a
general framework for analysing traffic safety from an
ethical perspective and encouraging further discussion
concerning problems, policies and technology in this area.
Subjects and methods The problems presented in the article
are criminalisation, paternalism, privacy, justice and respon-
sibility, and the reasons for choosing these are the
following. First, they are all important areas in moral
philosophy. Second, they are fairly general and it should be
possible to categorise more specific problems under these
headings. Ethical aspects of road traffic have not received
the philosophical attention they deserve. Every year, more
than 1 million people die globally in traffic accidents, and
20 to 50 million people are injured. Ninety per cent of the
road traffic fatalities occur in low- and middle-income
countries, where it is a growing problem. Politics, economics,
culture and technology affect the number of fatalities and
injuries, and the measures used to combat deaths in traffic as
well as the role of road traffic should be ethically scrutinised.
The topics are analysed and discussed from a moral-
philosophical perspective, and the discussion includes both
theory and applications.
Results and conclusion The author concludes with some
thoughts on how the ethical discussion can be included in
the public debate on how to save lives in road traffic.
People in industrialised societies are so used to road traffic
that it is almost seen as part of nature. Consequently, we do
not acknowledge that we can introduce change and that we
can affect the role we have given road traffic and cars. By
acknowledging the ethical aspects of road traffic and
illuminating the way the choices society makes are ethically
charged, it becomes clear that there are alternative ways to
design the road traffic system. The most important general
conclusion is that discussion concerning these alternative




In the month of September 2001, more people died in car
crashes in the United States than in the terrorist attacks
(Husak 2004). Every year, more than 1 million people die
globally in road crashes, and 20 to 50 million people are
injured. Ninety per cent of the road traffic fatalities occur in
low- and middle-income countries, where it is a growing
problem. Road traffic accidents are the ninth leading cause
of disease in the world (Peden et al. 2004). In spite of the
gravity of the problem of traffic fatalities, it is seldom
discussed as an ethical problem or as giving rise to ethical
questions. It is the aim of this paper to provide a general
overview of ethical aspects of traffic safety, the focus being
on the fatalities and injuries road traffic causes and some
major ethical aspects of the measures used to save lives.
The main purpose is to show that just as transportation is
analysed and discussed from economic, technological,
political and geographical perspectives, its ethical dimen-
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discussed. Philosophers have not extensively discussed
ethical problems relating to transport, although there are
some exceptions (Nihlén Fahlquist 2006; Husak 2004;
Husak 1994; Zeitler 1997), nor have ethics been compre-
hensively incorporated in the transportation safety dis-
course, although there are exceptions (Evans 2008; Evans
2004; Hokstad and Vatn 2008; Elvik 2006; Elvik 1999). In
transportation as well as in health care, people die and are
prevented from dying due to actions and omissions of
individuals as well as functioning and dysfunctional
systems and policies. Accordingly, a continuous ethical
discussion concerning road traffic is needed. The areas
discussed in the following are criminalisation, paternalism,
privacy, justice and responsibility.
1 The reasons for this
focus is that these are five important areas in moral
philosophy and together they provide a rough list according
to which many of the more specific ethically relevant issues
arising in traffic safety can be categorised.
Criminalisation
In the intersection between law and moral philosophy the
question arises of what acts should be considered criminal
and in need of punishment. Obviously there are a number
of acts in road traffic that are criminalised, and there is a
constant discussion in many societies about which acts
should be punished and how.
There are two major philosophical perspectives on
punishment: retributivists argue that we punish because
offenders deserve to be punished and consequentialists
argue that punishment is justified only if it is likely to have
more advantageous consequences than refraining from
punishing would. The law and public debates about law
are often a mix of these two perspectives, and this is the
case when it comes to traffic legislation.
Social and cultural beliefs, norms and conventions affect
the way people view the severity of different traffic
offences. Some of the traffic offences are considered less
severe by a majority of people, whereas others are seen as
more serious. Speeding is an example of an offence that is
often not considered a major breach of the law, even though
speeding is said to be one of the most important causes of
traffic mortality (Corbett 2000). In spite of this, about 50%
of Swedish car drivers exceed speed limits. High speed
contributes substantially to collisions, and the speed that
vehicles have in a collision is crucial to the severity of
resulting injuries (Vägverket/Swedish National Road Admin-
istration 2005). It is estimated that about 150 lives could be
saved in Sweden every year if everyone stopped exceeding
the speed limits.
2 Against this background, the general
acceptance of speeding appears quite peculiar. In contrast,
drunk driving is considered immoral, and road crashes
involving intoxicated drivers resulting in fatality often spur
emotionally laden debates concerning how to punish drunk
drivers. This example shows that there are conventions about
what is right and wrong in road traffic, and these
conventions should be questioned in light of what traffic
safety researchers find out about the causes of fatalities and
injuries. The two philosophical views on punishment
become clear when some people suggest long prison
sentences and compare driving after drinking to murder,
whereas others express their doubts as to whether this is
effective, i.e. focussing on the consequences.
An important aim of criminalising an act is to prevent
people from performing that act. Whether criminalisation
will actually lead to prevention is an empirical question,
and it has been argued that this is an often-neglected fact.
Schonsheck argues that philosophers and lawyers implicitly
assume that if an act is criminalised, people will automat-
ically conform to the new law. In other words, ‘prohibition’
and ‘prevention’ are used interchangeably (Schonsheck,
1994). Furthermore, he argues, if we instead talk about
criminal prohibition as an attempt to prevent, this forces us
to consider failure and alternative ways to prevent the
unwanted act. The discussion of whether to criminalise a
certain act must take the consequences of enactment and
enforcement as well as side effects and costs into account
(Schonsheck 1994).
To illustrate, consider driving under the influence of
alcohol. This is an offence in most countries, and it is
sometimes argued that a case of drunk driving resulting in a
fatality should be compared to murder. According to
Schonsheck’s argument above, even before criminalising
driving under the influence of alcohol we ought to consider
alternative ways and carefully analyse whether criminalis-
ing the act of drunk driving is the most effective way to
achieve this result. One alternative method for managing
the problem of drunk driving is the so-called alcohol
interlock. This is a device that makes it impossible to drive
after drinking. The driver has to prove her sobriety through
an exhalation sample before starting the car. The interlock
is connected to the car’s ignition, and if the measured level
is above the maximum level set, the car will not start.
Obviously, to force all vehicles to install such a device
represents a completely different way of dealing with drunk
driving and is likely to meet substantial resistance.
1 The environmental problems associated with road traffic are not
discussed in this particular paper, but it should be acknowledged that
they too imply important ethical problems. The focus in this paper is
on the prevention of road traffic fatalities and injuries.
2 The road traffic death toll in Sweden is about 400-500 lives a year.
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interlocks should be addressed (Grill and Nihlén Fahlquist,
forthcoming). The point is that there are different ways of
solving the problem of drunk driving, and criminalisation is
one of several methods. Before criminalising an act, or
when confronting the question of whether to make the
punishment more severe than previously, alternative meth-
ods should be discussed before a decision is made. If it is
possible to solve a problem like drunk driving without
raising the penalties or criminalising more acts, we should at
least consider these other methods and treat them as potential
alternatives.
The argument above is, of course, a consequentialist one.
However, we do not punish solely to prevent unwanted
actions. Drunk driving may be criminalised and punished
because it is simply seen as morally wrong to risk people’s
lives by drinking and driving. Douglas Husak, who sets out
to determine the seriousness of drunk driving, has discussed
this line of thought. The idea is that the offender should be
punished in proportion to her desert, which is a function of
how serious the offence is (Husak 1994). According to
Husak, drunk driving per se is not a very serious crime, but
a hierarchy of drunk driving offences should be created that
distinguishes between aggravated drunk driving, which is
considered a serious offence, and ordinary drunk driving,
which is not. Whereas ordinary drunk driving does not
create a substantially higher risk of injury compared to
sober driving, drunk driving with BAC 0.2% does (Husak
1994).
Paternalism
Accusations of paternalism are common in the history of
traffic safety debates, for example, about the mandatory use
of seatbelts, bicycle helmets and motorcycle helmets. It is
argued that individual freedom and responsibility are
diminished when people are not allowed to decide for
themselves whether to accept a certain risk.
There are two major justifications for laws requiring
people to use such potentially liberty-limiting devices. First,
there is an economic incentive to reduce the costs of saving
lives and rehabilitating people. Second, and more contro-
versial, it may be argued that people should be forced to,
for example, use a seatbelt for their own good.
Mill, in his famous defence of anti-paternalism, asserts
that the only justified interference with the liberty of
individuals is that which is aimed at protecting other
individuals from harm, the so-called Harm Principle (Mill
1985). Since then, many theorists have contributed to the
debate on paternalism.
It is possible to argue for the mandatory use of seatbelts
from a paternalistic viewpoint or merely from an economic
perspective or to combine the two. The proponent of
paternalism has two potential justifications for such a law,
namely the cost to others and the harm to the individual not
using a seatbelt (Schonsheck 1994). The only liberal
argument for such a law is to point at the economic cost
for others created by those not using a seatbelt (Schonsheck
1994). The discussion on the potentially paternalistic
justification for seatbelts is only applicable to the driver,
since the driver can be said to be responsible for not
harming her passengers. It could be argued that requiring
the driver to make sure that her passengers use seatbelts is
an implication of the Harm Principle rather than an instance
of paternalism. It has been suggested that accepting Mill’s
anti-paternalist view does not necessarily entail refraining
from interfering with activities like driving with unbelted
passengers (Hansson 2006).
As argued by Dworkin concerning the law requiring
motorcyclists to wear a helmet, if the economic cost is the
only reason to require helmets, that could be achieved by
requiring that motorcyclists purchase a medical insurance to
cover that cost as a condition for licensing (Dworkin 1983).
Because motorcycling is such a risky activity and the law
requiring motorcyclists to wear a helmet appears to be quite
a reasonable law, it has been said to be an “embarrassment”
to the liberal and to make the strongest case for hard
paternalism (Feinberg 1986).
Often, in real cases, it is not completely clear whether
potentially paternalistic measures are introduced purely for
paternalistic reasons or because of the societal costs
associated with not implementing the new policy. Discus-
sions concerning potentially liberty-limiting devices will
surely continue to arise in the context of traffic safety.
However, road traffic is very different from, for example,
smoking in that driving a car exposes others to substantial
risks. The best defence for making alcohol interlocks
mandatory in all cars, for instance, is probably that the
driver who drinks before driving her car exposes others
to a substantial risk. A smoker who does not smoke
outside her own free-standing house does not directly
cause harm to others, so a prohibition on smoking would
arguably be more paternalistic than a law on alcohol
interlocks.
Privacy
During the twentieth century, car driving became a central
feature of the social, economic and cultural development of
the Western world. Culturally, it is strongly associated with
the values of autonomy, independence and freedom of
movement. Surely, this is one important reason for the
unwillingness of people to be exposed to surveillance
cameras and other kinds of control of their driving. There is
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between the idea of a freedom of movement and an
accessible transportation system on the one hand and
safety on the other. We want to be able to move freely
without restrictions, but we also want to be safe. Those
who argue that privacy is merely a prima facie right could
possibly argue that safety is a more fundamental value,
whereas those embracing a more liberal approach would
advocate the value of individual freedom and privacy. The
association between the automobile and such values is
very strong. It has even been argued that “automobility”
complements autonomy and that automobiles enhance
privacy (Lomasky 1997).
Due to technological development there are a number
of new possibilities that either force road users, primarily
car drivers, to behave in a certain way to increase safety
or that control the behaviour of road users. Alcohol
interlocks are an example of the former and surveillance
cameras an example of the latter. The development of
information technology provides helpful tools that can be
used to enhance safety, but sometimes at the possible
expense of the privacy of individuals. Vehicle safety
technology has been developed with the aim to connect
vehicles with roadside infrastructure, and this is likely to
have substantial safety benefits, but also to increase the
risk of extensive surveillance (Zimmer 2005). This raises
questions concerning the problem of “privacy in public”.
Nissenbaum argues that although lawyers and philoso-
phers have discussed privacy frequently, the focus has
been on personal and sensitive information. The problem
today is that a large part of the information that can be and
is collected is from the previously more or less ignored
public sphere. Hence, theories concerning the right to
privacy should address the problem of privacy in public
(Nissenbaum 1998).
Nissenbaum suggests that the problem of privacy in
public should be addressed by conceptualising privacy as
“contextual integrity”, which essentially means that every
context has its own norms of appropriateness and distribu-
tion, meaning that what information it is appropriate to
share and how this information is to be distributed vary in
different contexts (Nissenbaum 2004). Zimmer applies
these ideas to highway travel, attempting to establish what
the existing norms of appropriateness and distribution are in
the context of highway travel. He suggests that while it is
considered appropriate to share information that is easily
observed, for example, the license plate number, it is not in
accordance with existing norms to share information about
the identity of the vehicle’s occupants. Furthermore, while
it is appropriate to share information about license plate
numbers, prevailing norms of distribution restrict the ability
to receive additional information that is based on the license
plate number (Zimmer 2005).
Whereas it is important to take existing norms into
consideration, it should be acknowledged that we run the
risk of adjusting to less and less privacy, meaning that the
existing norms equal what we have come to accept because
of this adjustment. We should not merely focus on existing
norms, but also on critically examined norms.
With new technology being developed at an impressive
rate, there is hope that vehicle and road safety will improve
substantially. However, since a considerable part of that
new technology entails some form of information gather-
ing, its potential threat to privacy should be acknowledged.
What is essentially at issue is how to balance the values of
individual liberty and safety. Moreover, is what we do as
road users private or public? In the developed part of the
world, we are used to having access to a private space when
driving a car, and many people drive their cars in order to
escape the public sphere for a while. However, against the
background of the high number of fatalities and injuries,
driving a car is noticeably different than, for example, being
in one’s home, and it could be questioned whether the
private space we now seem to believe we have a right to is
reasonable, given the human and economic cost of road
traffic. It may not be reasonable to expect the same kind of
privacy in our cars as we do in our homes. On the other
hand, a considerable number of women die every year due
to domestic violence, which would indicate that the
argument of people dying is not adequate to defend privacy
intrusions in road traffic, but not in our homes. To what
extent we should trade privacy for safety is clearly a
difficult question, but it is an important ethical question to
ask in relation to road traffic.
Justice
Traditionally, the departments of transport and their related
agencies have managed traffic safety. Consequently,
mobility has been the main focus with an emphasis on
infrastructure and vehicles, neglecting the safety of non-
motorized road users (Peden et al. 2004). This is
problematic for several reasons. Children, young adults
and the elderly are disproportionately exposed to the risk of
being injured or killed in a road crash, especially if they are
pedestrians (Malek et al. 1990; Fontaine and Gourlet 1997;
Yee et al. 2006). Pedestrians and cyclists are generally
exposed to a greater risk than car drivers. Intuitively, there
appears to be a morally relevant difference between
different groups of road users.
3 Clearly, there are substantial
differences between child pedestrians and risk-seeking
3 A recent survey confirmed that many people have this concern, i.e.
that more money should be spent on saving children due to their
vulnerability, Hokstad and Vatn (2008), p. 1445.
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having contemplated the risks of doing that. The problem is
how to apply this intuition to policy-making and to what
extent. It has recently been argued that fewer resources
should be spent on “deliberate traffic offenders” in favour
of “innocent” road users, for reasons of fairness (Hokstad
and Vatn 2008).
Since vulnerable road users have a high risk exposure
and have to use the roads every day, perhaps they should be
the primary focus of safety interventions in areas they are
unable to avoid. It could be argued that they have a right to
move around outside in a way that does not correspond to a
right to drive a car. These groups are not merely the most
vulnerable, but in addition they sometimes lack the ability
to influence infrastructure, and this should be taken into
account in policy-making. Acknowledging the differences
of risk exposure and the imbalance of power and
responsibility between different groups of road users
illuminates the following question. For which group of
road users is the road system and the infrastructure
designed? Partly this is a practical question and a question
of how the road transport system has evolved gradually
since the introduction of the automobile, but the way the
system works today should be analysed from the perspec-
tive of justice as well. It has been argued that the modern
road transport system primarily is designed for car drivers,
for example due to the fact that enormous amounts of
money are spent on highways and the safety of automo-
biles as opposed to walking paths and the safety of
pedestrians and cyclists. Moreover, as mentioned above,
the automobile has been given priority at the cost of
pedestrians, and it has been argued that this should be
changed for environmental and public health reasons
(Gunnarsson 2005).
If society’s resources were unlimited it might be thought
imperative to save all road users from dying or being
injured in road traffic, or rather that it would be imperative
to save as many lives as possible as long as measures to
enhance safety do not carry with them an unreasonable
“ethical cost” in terms of, for instance, intrusions of privacy.
However, resources are limited, and priorities have to be set.
The question then becomes how resources should be used.
A common device used to decide whether certain road
safety measures should be introduced is cost-benefit
analysis, which implies that a measure should be taken if
the benefits outweigh the costs, but if the opposite is true it
should not. Cost-benefit analysis is “an operational defini-
tion of what public policy based on a utilitarian calculus
implies” (Elvik 2006). The benefits are often based on the
notion of willingness-to-pay (WTP), which refers to the
maximum amount of money a person is willing to pay for
that benefit. There are a number of problems with WTP, for
instance, that wealthy people often are willing to pay more
for two reasons. First, the marginal utility of money
declines as a function of the wealth, meaning that the
difference between 10 and 20 is greater than the difference
between 100 and 120. If a person is wealthy she is likely to
be willing to pay more since it does not make a big
difference to her financial situation, whereas it could make
a big difference for someone who is not as well off. Second,
it has been argued that poor people, having to choose more
carefully because of lack of resources, may prefer other
kinds of benefits at the cost of increased safety (Hokstad
and Vatn 2008).
Another concept that is used in this approach is value
of statistical life (VSL), which is a monetary measure of
the benefits to people from small risk reductions that
arise from safety projects (Hokstad and Vatn 2008).
Critics have argued that it is not acceptable to put a
monetary value on human life (Elvik 2001;F r a n k2000;
Hansson 2007;H a u e r1994).
Hokstad and Vatn argue that instead of treating utility
as the overriding rule for allocation of resources for risk
reduction, fairness should be the guiding rule, even if
cost-benefit analysis could be one useful tool in the
process of arriving at good and fair priorities (Hokstad
and Vatn 2008).
Following this line of thought, perhaps additional
resources should be spent on vulnerable road users, such
as child pedestrians, even if it is not the most cost-efficient
way to spend public funds. Instead, there are tendencies to
assume that children, the elderly and disabled people have
less value than non-disabled grown-ups. The concept of
disability-adjusted life year (DALY) is used to compare the
burden of disease in different countries. It puts a numerical
number on mortality and morbidity and counts the years
lost due to premature death and the years lived with
disabilities. Different disabilities have different numerical
values according to how much they are estimated to affect
quality of life. This model has been criticised, and one of
the objections to it is that the life year lost for a child or an
individual older than 55 is counted less than a life year lost
for a grown-up individual under the age of 55. Furthermore,
the DALY approach assumes that people with a disability
have less quality of life than people who do not have a
disability and that people with a disability are less entitled
to health resources (Arnesen and Nord 1999). This, of
course, goes against the intuition that vulnerable groups
should be protected and perhaps even be the standard
measure when designing the infrastructure. Moreover, the
very assumption that the quality of an individual’s life can
be measured objectively at all and that the only relevant
criterion to judge the quality of an individual’s life is
whether she has a disability or not and how big of an
impairment that particular disability is, from an objective
standpoint, raises concern. Surely, most people would be
J Public Health (2009) 17:385–394 389offended by the idea that their quality of life is judged by
people who do not know them and determined according
to an allegedly objective list with numbers attached to
disabilities. Moreover, as noticed by Arnesen and Nord, to
assume that the healthier a person is the more valuable their
life is to themselves and to society is contrary to the
Declaration of Human Rights and its basic notion that all
people are equal (Arnesen and Nord 1999).
Another problem is how groups with different risk
proneness should be treated. For example, motorcyclists
have a substantially higher risk of being killed or injured
than any other vehicle user (Elliott et al. 2007). It has been
estimated that the risk of being injured when travelling by
motorcycle is about ten times as high as when travelling by
car (Aare and von Holst 1999). The question is whether
motorcycling should be seen as a choice to expose oneself
to a greater risk and hence something for which one has to
bear a larger proportion of responsibility and possibly cost
than for driving a car.
There are local and global socio-economic patterns that
entail problems of justice. Poor countries and poor people
in all countries bear a disproportionate burden of disease
and fatalities. Apart from the cost in terms of human
suffering, the economic cost is substantial. It has been
estimated that the direct cost due to road crashes is about
1–2 per cent of GNP in low- and middle-income countries
and that the total cost to these economies is about US$ 65
billion, which is more than the total annual amount of
development assistance they receive (Jacobs et al. 2000;
Nantulya and Reich 2003). Furthermore, there is a growing
gap between high-income countries and low- and middle-
income countries, with the former experiencing improved
safety, whereas the latter experience increasing rates of
trafficmortalityandinjuries (Jacobs et al. 2000). Concerning
health and safety, studies have shown that socio-economic
factors affect the severity of injury (Zambon and Hasselberg
2006). Furthermore, socio-economic differences affect inju-
ries even when individuals from different socio-economic
groups drive cars that are equally safe (Laflamme et al. 2005).
The fact that poor people in all countries and regions are
exposed to a greater risk is partly due to the fact that they
cannot afford to drive a car. Instead, they have to walk,
ride a bicycle or motorized two-wheeler or go by public
transport. This has implications for the way technology and
safety policies are exported from high-income countries. In
high-income countries, more car occupants are killed in
crashes, which is due to the higher degree of motorization,
hence the focus on vehicle safety. Obviously, a focus on
vehicle safety would not be the most effective way to
reduce the number of fatalities and injuries in countries
where vulnerable road users like pedestrians and cyclists
are more frequently killed and injured than car occupants
(Ameratunga et al. 2006).
The problem of the unequal global burden of road traffic
fatalities and injuries is related to the philosophical debate
on how theories of distributive justice and human rights
should incorporate aspects of health and health care
(Daniels 2001). It has been argued that health inequalities
are worse than other kinds of inequalities and that health is
of special moral importance (Daniels et al. 2004). Further-
more, the concept of health equity should not merely
include the distribution of health care, but also the
capability to achieve good health (Sen 2004). If I have a
right to health or a right not to be killed or severely injured
in a car crash when I go to the grocery store to buy some
milk, whose duty is it to substantiate that right? Is it the
government’s duty or, against the background of global
inequalities, is it an international duty that should be
fulfilled by the United Nations? The concept of a right is
not unproblematic in relation to risk exposure. Moral
philosophy has traditionally focussed on cases where
alternatives for action are given beforehand and where the
consequences of these actions are well known. This is often
not the case, and whereas a majority of people would agree
that killing is wrong, they might be less certain when
confronted with a case of exposing someone to a risk of
getting killed or injured. Whereas most people would agree
that it is not acceptable for me to expose someone else to
the risk of being run over by my car if the probability is 1 in
10, it is less clear whether it is permissible if the risk is 1 in
1,000,000. (Hansson 2003). If we have an absolute right
not to be exposed to the risk of being killed or severely
injured by traffic, this would effectively mean that road
traffic, in its current shape, would not be allowed. In this
case, that right is severely infringed upon everywhere in the
world. Most people would probably not approve of such a
right since it would dramatically reduce mobility and
have serious effects on the economy. So either the
concept of a right is not appropriate for road traffic
safety or it has to be modified. Perhaps the right could
be said to be a right to live in a society where everything
that is practically and economically possible has been
done to reduce the risk of being killed or severely
injured, especially for vulnerable road users. But this
becomes a rather vaguely formulated right because it is
difficult to determine what “everything that is practically
and economically possible” means.
Against the background of the global inequalities in road
traffic mortality and injuries, a central question to be
addressed is what high-income countries can and should
do in order to assist low- and middle-income countries to
build infrastructure and vehicles in a way that promotes
safety. Although successful strategies in high-income
societies could sometimes be transferred, this should be
done with caution since the social, cultural and political
contexts are different (Nantulya and Reich 2003).
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Traditionally, driving a car has been seen as associated with
the individual and her autonomy and independence.
Consequently, accidents have largely been considered an
individual responsibility, and a collision has been seen as
the result of either unfortunate circumstances or individuals
acting wrongly. Increasingly, road safety is instead seen as a
joint effort and responsibility as distributed between
different actors. Traditionally, the focus of traffic safety
policy has been the backward-looking responsibility of the
individual road users (Peden et al. 2004). The question has
been who caused a road crash, and it has been assumed that
if A caused the event E, if someone is worthy of blame for
it, it would be A, and A has been an individual road user.
The focus on individual causal responsibility and blame-
worthiness is probably connected to the assumption that the
most important cause of road crashes is human error
(Petridou and Moustaki 2000). However, a recent study
shows that inadequate road design is the most important
cause of people dying in road crashes (Stigsson 2006).
Changing the view of causation may be part of a new
emerging perspective on responsibility and traffic safety. In
1997 the Swedish Parliament adopted a governmental bill
that introduced the so-called Vision Zero as the long-term
goal for all traffic safety projects in the country. It received
substantial attention, and critics accused the proponents of
setting unrealistic and possibly naïve targets. Vision Zero
also entailed a fundamentally new view on responsibility
and traffic safety. The so-called system designers (e.g,
vehicle-producing companies and road maintainers) were
assigned a forward-looking responsibility, and it was said
that the most important safety-increasing measure was to
improve the systems. Hence, the focus shifted from the
individual road user to the system designers and from
backward-looking responsibility to forward-looking respon-
sibility. Emphasising the systems also entails a shift of
focus from the triggering causal factors to the underlying
ones. According to Vision Zero individuals are still
responsible for following traffic rules, but if they do not
live up to these expectations, the system designers must
take measures (Nihlén Fahlquist 2006).
4
So, what could this mean in practice? As an example,
consider a road crash. Let us say that individual A had been
drinking alcohol previous to her driving. She obviously did
not take responsibility, since she did not follow the rules
prohibiting drunk driving. Regardless of how we deal with
the causal responsibility and potential blame, the system
designers are ascribed responsibility in the forward-looking
sense. In practice, this could imply legislation on alcohol
interlocks, installing an alcohol interlock in her car, etc.
This represents a more pragmatic outlook since it asks what
the system designers can do about the more general
problem of drunk driving, given that many individual road
users do not take responsibility. It is a more realistic
approach than the previous one because it acknowledges
the facts, in this case that people sometimes ignore traffic
legislation. Hopefully what we achieve by blaming (and
establishing legal liability) A is that she does not do it
again, and if she is also an alcoholic we can hope that she
will get help for her disease. However, this does not solve
the general problem of drunk driving. To focus on forward-
looking responsibility appears to be an effective approach
particularly in cases where there are technological devices,
like alcohol interlocks, that can solve that general problem.
To what extent the automobile industry should be consid-
ered responsible, for example, for how they promote new
cars is another important aspect to be taken into account.
Wetmore describes a change in perspective in the USA that
occurred gradually during the twentieth century. In the first
part of the century, drivers were considered to be
completely responsible, and safety was perceived as being
a matter of collision-avoidance. This was eventually
replaced in the 1950s–1960s by the so-called crashwor-
thiness approach that emphasised the “second collision”, i.e.
what happened after the collision in the phase where injuries
occur. This conception of safety put focus on the responsi-
bility of automobile producers who, it was argued, should
develop technology that protects people inside their cars.
They were supposed to compensate for the shortcomings of
the drivers, whose errors and mistakes would always be a
fact. This perspective redistributed responsibility from the
driver to the vehicle and those who develop technology
(Wetmore 2004).
When analysing issues of responsibility it is useful to
compare road traffic and other modes of transportation, e.g.
aviation. The question is how conventions of responsibility
distributions have been developed in different areas. It goes
without saying that there are differences between road
traffic and aviation as modes of transportation and perhaps
the different conventions of responsibility are completely
justifiable. However, there may also be similarities that
should be acknowledged. One of the differences between
road traffic and air traffic is that the pilot, besides being the
one who flies the plane, is often employed by an airline
company and that her passengers in these cases are also
customers. This contractual situation has consequences for
4 Norway adopted Vision Zero in 2001. The “Sustainable Traffic
Safety” approach in The Netherlands stresses that the unpredictable
and fallible nature of human beings as the weakest link in the transport
system should be taken into account as a reason to build safer,
sustainable systems to be able to cope with human error [Pieter van
Vliet and Govert Schemers (2000) “Sustainable safety” Ministry of
Transport, Public Works and Water Management (http://www.rws-avv.
nl/pls/portal30/docs/1771.PDF), p. 9]. These are similar examples of a
changing perspective focussing more on systemic improvement than
individual errors and blame.
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the contract between the employer and the employee
and the one between the customers/passengers and the
pilot as well as the airline affects the distribution of
responsibility. The contracts oblige the pilot to take certain
safety measures and to adopt a cautious attitude to flying. A
question that may be asked is why the explicit pilot-in-
command’s responsibility which makes the pilot responsi-
ble for everyone’s, safety on board the aeroplane, does not
apply to the car driver.
It is increasingly being acknowledged that road safety is
not merely about individual behaviour and that institutional
actors should take responsibility in order to decrease the
number of fatalities. For example, the European Union has
set the target to halve the number of traffic fatalities by
2010.
Conclusion
I would like to end this overview of ethical problem areas
in traffic safety with some concluding thoughts on how
these five ethical topics can be included and inform policy.
Criminalisation
Attempts should be made to analyse the problem at hand
carefully and as open-mindedly as possible before rushing
to the conclusion that the best way to reduce or eliminate an
unwanted and harmful behaviour is to criminalise and
punish. Alternatives should be considered and creativity in
problem solving encouraged. A good example is drunk
driving where the alcohol interlock is a device worth
considering as an alternative or at least additional measure
to punishment.
Paternalism
Most measures to increase safety in road traffic can be
motivated by the notion of protecting others against harm,
which means that even a liberal can endorse them.
However, there are some measures where the most
beneficial to society may be to ignore it, for example
motorcyclists not wearing a helmet, but where most people
still believe society should protect individuals against harm
by legislation or technology. It should be acknowledged
that this is the case, and it would be helpful to carefully
analyse and discuss new measures, keeping in mind the
distinction between harming others and harming oneself. In
some cases, most people share an intuition that a measure is
justifiable even though it is paternalistic, but in other cases
paternalistic measures appear unjustifiable. By acknowl-
edging and discussing such issues freely and publicly we
make sure that new laws and technologies are at least closer
to being ethically justifiable.
Privacy
There appears to be a fundamental difference between
privacy in our own homes and privacy on the road. The
reasons we are equally attached to the notion of privacy in
ourcarsaswearetoprivacyinourhomesaretradition,culture
and habits. We should recognise that the great degree of risk-
exposure associated with driving may imply that the
expectation of privacy on the road is not reasonable.
Justice
A humane society protects vulnerable human beings. A
humane infrastructure protects vulnerable road users, for
example children, the elderly and disabled people. This
implies that we should not count their lives or the quality of
their lives less than others. It may even mean that additional
attention should be directed at protecting such groups. A
minimal requirement should be that potential damaging
effects on vulnerable groups should always be taken into
account when planning infrastructural projects.
Responsibility
The traditional view of responsibility for traffic safety is
closely attached to the notion that safety is about individuals
driving safely and that accidents are caused by drivers.
While this is true to some extent, the emerging view that a
major role can and should be played by institutions, for
example governments and vehicle-producing companies, is
useful and reasonable. The implied notion is that responsi-
bility has to be distributed and shared between different
actors if a safer road traffic environment is to be achieved.
People in industrialised societies are so used to road
traffic that it is almost considered a part of nature.
Consequently, we do not acknowledge that we can
introduce change and that we can affect the role we have
given road traffic and cars. By acknowledging the ethical
aspects of road traffic and illuminating the way the choices
society makes are ethically charged, it becomes clear that
there are alternative ways to design the road traffic system.
The most important general conclusion is that discussion
concerning these alternative ways of designing the system
should be encouraged. Here are some examples of ques-
tions to address in public debates:
– What are the reasons for prohibiting certain behaviour
or requiring a certain safety device—to protect the
individual from herself, to protect others or to save
money? Which of these reasons are valid?
392 J Public Health (2009) 17:385–394– Should society criminalise unsafe behaviour or use
technology (when possible) to eliminate the unwanted
behaviour?
– To what extent is it reasonable to expect privacy on the
road?
– Should additional measures be used to protect vulner-
able road users?
– Should safety be seen as the result of individuals
behaving responsibly or the system designers designing
safe systems?
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